

A Novel Side-Channel in Real-Time Schedulers


Chien-Ying (CY) Chen, Sibin Mohan, Rodolfo Pellizzoni,
Rakesh B. Bobba and Negar Kiyavash




25th IEEE Real-time And Embedded Technology And Applications Symposium (RTAS'19)
April 17, 2019

This work is supported by the National Science Foundation (NSF) under grant SaTC-1718952.

Imagine you (an attacker) have control of a real-time task
in an autonomous system




You want to take over control of the steering and throttle




Problem Statement

Goal: When do critical tasks arrive in the future?



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
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Different task initial offsets yield completely different schedules.

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Goal: When do critical tasks arrive in the future?



Different task initial offsets yield completely different schedules.

System and Adversary Model

■ Uniprocessor, Fixed-Priority Hard Real-Time Systems

 **Attacker's task (observer task)** periodic or sporadic

 **Victim task** periodic

➤ **Other tasks** periodic or sporadic

■ Requirements

- The attacker knows the **victim task's period**
- The observer task has **lower priority** than the victim task.



■ Attack Goal




- Infer the victim task's initial offset and predict its future arrival time points.

Attack Scenario Overview


The attacker **observes** the schedule on the victim system.

The attacker **analyzes** and **infers** precise timing information of the victim task.

The attacker **launches a major attack** at a future instant that can cause the most amount of damage.



ScheduLeak Algorithms



2

System Schedule Ground Truth:



 Observer Task τ_o
 Other Tasks


Task ID	Period	Execution Time
Task 4	15	1
Observer Task	10	2
Victim Task	8	2
Task 1	6	1

The ScheduLeak Algorithms


2

Organize the execution intervals
in a schedule ladder diagram


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
Divide the timeline into sections of length = 8 (the victim task's period) and stack:





The ScheduLeak Algorithms



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The ScheduLeak Algorithms




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The ScheduLeak Algorithms

3

Infer the victim task's initial offset

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


The ScheduLeak Algorithms

3

Infer the victim task's initial offset

We take the **earliest time point** of the empty column as the inference of the victim task's initial offset.





Occupied by the tasks with higher priorities
(e.g. the victim task)


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The ScheduLeak Algorithms

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The **victim task's future arrival times** can be computed by





Demonstration 2




Cache-Timing Side-Channel Attacks

Attack Goals:

- Probe (coarse-grained) memory usage of victim task
- Recover locations of interest points where memory usage (of victim task) is high




✗ Without ScheduLeak-based Information



✓ With ScheduLeak-based Information

Correlation between Observer Task & Victim Task




Task	Period
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
A ladder diagram with width = 8 (the victim task's period)

Correlation between Observer Task & Victim Task

Task	Period
Observer Task	10
Victim Task	8



Correlation between Observer Task & Victim Task




Task	Period
Observer Task	10
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Coverage Ratio

$$C(\tau_o, \tau_v) = \frac{e_o}{GCD(p_o, p_v)}$$

Correlation between Observer Task & Victim Task



Task	Period
Observer Task	10
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Coverage Ratio

$$C(\tau_o, \tau_v) = \frac{e_o}{GCD(p_o, p_v)}$$

Simulation-based Performance Evaluation

■ Metrics



Inference Precision Ratio

the ratio of how close the inference to the true initial offset



Inference Success Rate

an inference is successful if attacker is able to exactly infer the victim task's initial offset

■ Variables



Attack
Duration



Task Set
Utilization



The Number
of Tasks



Sporadic
Task Ratio



Observer
Task Priority



Coverage
Ratio

Experiment Result Highlights



Precision
Ratio



Success
Rate



Attack
Duration



The Number
of Tasks



Coverage
Ratio



Sporadic
Task Ratio



Task Set
Utilization




Observer
Task Priority



Experiment Result Highlights

Precision Ratio = 0.99, Success Rate = 97%



Precision Ratio



Success Rate



Attack Duration



The Number of Tasks



Coverage Ratio



Sporadic Task Ratio



Task Set Utilization



Observer Task Priority






Conclusion



The attacker **observes** and **analyzes** the schedule on the victim system.

The attacker **infers** precise timing information of the victim task.

The attacker **launches a major attack** at a future instant that can cause the most amount of damage.



Thank you.



Demo videos are available at <https://scheduleak.github.io/>



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Backup Materials

Implementation and Attack Case Studies

■ Cache-timing side-channel attacks

- FreeRTOS
- Zedboard Xilinx Zynq[®]-7000
- Hardware-in-the-loop UAV



■ Interference with control (actuation signals) of CPS

- Real-time Linux
- Raspberry Pi 3 Model B
- Ground rover/quadcopter



Coverage Ratio


Coverage ratio is defined as

$$C(\tau_o, \tau_v) = \frac{e_o}{GCD(p_o, p_v)}$$

The coverage ratio can be loosely interpreted as **the proportion of the time columns covered by the observer task** in the schedule ladder diagram.


If $C(\tau_o, \tau_v) \geq 1$, then the attacker can observe the victim task. Otherwise it is not guaranteed that the victim task is observable by the attacker.

Experiment Results



Experiment Results

Observation Duration




Success rate and precision ratio are stabilized after $5 \cdot LCM(p_o, p_v)$

- Success rate: 97%
- Precision ratio: 0.99

Note: each data point represents the mean of 12000 tasksets for the given observation duration.

Experiment Results

Number of Tasks & Taskset Utilization




the inference precision ratio **decreases** as the number of tasks in a task set **increases**.

The inference precision ratio **increases** as the task set utilization **increases**.

Note: The drop is mainly caused by a high priority victim task with low task set utilization.
Observation duration is $10 \cdot LCM(p_o, p_v)$.

Experiment Results

Proportion of Sporadic Tasks




The algorithms perform better with sporadic tasks, with a **ascending trend** as the proportion of sporadic tasks **increases**.

The change in the performance is **less than 1%**, which is subtle.

Note: 0% means a taskset contains no sporadic task (all periodic tasks).
Observation duration is $10 \cdot LCM(p_o, p_v)$.

Experiment Results

Coverage Ratio



Higher coverage ratio yields better success rate and inference precision.

The success rate is about 59.9% (precision ratio is 0.819) when the coverage ratio is around 0.5.

Note: Each data point represents the mean of 12000 tasksets.
Observation duration is $10 \cdot LCM(p_o, p_v)$.